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INDIGENOUS IDENTITIES AND MILITARY FRONTIERS
Refl ections on San and the Military 
in Namibia and Angola, 1960-2000*
What was the role of  San in the confl icts of  Southeast Angola and Northeast 
Namibia during the period 1960-2000? What were the effects of  this involvement 
on their identity-building processes? Much of  this history has yet to be written. 
Based on fi eld research in the period 2003-2006, and on secondary sources, this 
piece emphasizes that the socio-political and economic ramifi cations of  ‘militarized’ 
San identities extend beyond the periods of  confl ict themselves.
The paper focuses on Khwe, a San group living in West Caprivi, but highlights 
parallels and connections between the roles and identity-building of  San under 
the military in both Namibia and Angola. Their collaboration with the apartheid 
military has contributed to the construction of  Khwe as a ‘subversive’ threat to 
nation-building. Simultaneously, Khwe in Namibia and immigrant !Xun in South 
Africa have often sought to gloss over their military past in favour of  mobilizing 
identities as ‘indigenous people’ to garner support from NGOs and strengthen 
their claims to authority. The effects and implications of  San military identities 
in post-confl ict southeast Angola are yet to be studied; this paper offers pre-
liminary suggestions for themes to be investigated. 
Identités indigènes et frontières militaires.
Réfl exions sur la militarisation des San en Namibie et en Angola, 1960-2000
Quel fut le rôle des San dans les confl its entre 1960 et 2000 dans les régions 
du Sud-Est angolais et Nord-Est namibien (Caprivi) ? Quels en furent les effets 
sur les processus de construction identitaire de ces populations ? L’essentiel de 
cette histoire reste à écrire. Ce travail s’appuie sur une recherche de terrain entre 
2003 et 2006 et sur des sources secondaires ; il permet de montrer que les 
identités « militarisées » des San ont des ramifi cations dépassant largement la 
seule période des confl its.
Cet article traite des Khwe – un groupe san vivant dans l’ouest du Caprivi –, 
et souligne le parallèle et les liens entre rôles et construction de l’identité san en 
Namibie et en Angola en contexte militarisé. Leur collaboration avec l’armée 
pendant l’apartheid les fait apparaître comme une menace « subversive » pour 
la nation en formation. Dans le même temps, les Khwe de Namibie et les 
immigrants !Xun d’Afrique du sud cherchent à minimiser leur passé militaire, 
dans une tentative de mobiliser leur identité comme « peuple indigène » afi n 
d’attirer le soutien des ONG et de renforcer leur légitimité. Dans le sud-est 
angolais, les effets et implications sur les identités des San militarisés dans la 
période post-confl it restent à étudier et cet article ne fait que suggérer quelques 
pistes de recherche. 
* We are grateful to Gertrud Boden, Rob Gordon and Lusotopie’s reviewers for their com-
ments on earlier versions of  this paper.
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Refl exões sobre a militarização dos San na Namibia e em Angola, 1960-2000
Qual foi o papel dos San nos confl itos do sudeste de Angola e o nordeste da 
Namíbia (Caprivi) entre 1960 e 2000 ? Quais foram os efeitos deste envolvimento 
nos seus processos de construção identitária ? Falta escrever uma grande parte 
desta história. Com base no trabalho de campo realizado no período entre 2003 
e 2006, e em fontes secundárias, este trabalho realça o facto que as ramifi cações 
socio-políticas e económicas das identidades « militarizadas » dos San prolongam-
se além dos períodos dos confl itos.
Este artigo fala dos Khwe, um grupo San que vive na zona occidental de 
Caprivi, mas sublinha os paralelos e as relações entre os papéis e a contrução 
identitária dos San num contexto militar na Namíbia e em Angola. A sua 
colaboração com o exército durante o apartheid contribuíu para uma imagem 
dos Khwe como uma ameaça « subversiva » para a nação em formação. Ao 
mesmo tempo, os Khwe na Namíbia e os imigrantes !Xun na África do Sul 
procuraram muitas vezes minimizar o seu passado militar para mobilizarem a 
sua identidade como « povo indígena », para garantir o apoio das ONGs e 
reforçar as suas reivindicações junto das autoridades. Os efeitos e as implicações 
na identidade dos San militarizados do sudeste de Angola no período pós-confl ito 
precisam de ser estudados e este artigo sugere algumas pistas de investigação.
In the early years of  Namibia’s Independence, the ruling party South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) has often promoted nation-building discourses 
captured by the slogan “One Namibia, One Nation”, as a means to counteract 
the multiple social and racial divisions imposed and fostered by apartheid under 
South African rule. Yet for all its talk of  unifi cation, SWAPO has at times also 
displayed exclusionist tendencies which are grounded on discourses about ethnic-
ity and past political affi liations. SWAPO contributed in the 1990s and early 2000s 
to constructing a stigmatised identity for the Khwe. Critical to this is the history 
of  San collaboration with the apartheid military during Namibia’s liberation 
struggle. These dynamics intersect with Angolan history in important ways, not 
only because Angolan San were among those recruited by the South African 
military, but also because by the early 1970s Angolan San were already being 
constructed as traitors for their collaboration with Portuguese forces. This paper 
focuses on Khwe in Namibia, but highlights preliminary parallels and connections 
between the roles and identity-building of  San under the military in both Namibia 
and Angola. The paper argues that the ramifi cations of  San military identities 
extend well beyond periods of  confl ict themselves. 
The paper fi rst provides an overview of  recent history of  San groups living in 
the region comprised by southeastern Angola and Namibia’s Caprivi strip, high-
lighting the signifi cant dearth of  research on Angolan San groups in particular. 
It begins with a brief  overview of  San-Bantu relations and the ways in which 
San interacted with the colonial and apartheid states in Angola and Namibia. It 
outlines the participation of  Angolan San groups in the Angolan liberation 
struggle and the attitudes of  other Angolans towards the San and the realm of  
‘the bush’ during that period. The paper also discusses the implications of  Angolan 
San military identities in the post-independence period, when they largely fl ed the 
country and dispersed throughout southern Africa partly due to fear of  retaliation 
from the victorious liberation movements against whom they had fought. Many 
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enlisted in the South African Defense Force (SADF) alongside the Khwe to fi ght 
against SWAPO in the Namibian war of  independence.
Turning to Namibia, we look at how the SADF contributed towards creating 
a distinctive identity for both Namibian and Angolan San during the 1970s and 
1980s, particularly for those in military camps in Caprivi. This had signifi cant 
social, political and economic ramifi cations for San groups in the post-Independence 
period, in relation to the relocation of  many San to South Africa; Caprivi’s 
political instability at the end of  the 1990s; and Angola’s civil war which only 
ended in 2002. Constructions of  Khwe identity by different parties continued to 
inform struggles over land, resources and authority among the state, NGOs and 
different ethnic groups after 1990. These constructions were grounded on an 
intersection of  discourses around ethnicity, race and nation-building. Key themes 
from liberation struggle narratives – those concerning collaboration with, and 
resistance against, white minority rule – were important for this identity construc-
tion, as employed by a range of  different actors. 
Many Khwe mobilised a ‘Khwe’ identity, drawing on ‘indigenous rights’ and 
environmental discourses in order to strengthen their claims to authority. In 
response, some government actors and members of  other ethnic groups tried to 
undermine Khwe political legitimacy by narrating histories of  nationalism and 
collaboration that stigmatised Khwe (Orth 2003, Boden 2003). The notion of  
Khwe political subversion (ie. their suspected collaboration with enemies of  the 
state) also had implications for their relationships with NGOs and for NGO 
activities. This paper argues that discourses about Khwe subversion were a nuanced 
and effective means of  excluding Khwe from certain civic rights. This in turn had 
social and economic consequences. In sum, these constructions of  Khwe identity 
served to reinforce the construction of  ethnic difference in West Caprivi, in con-
trast to government narratives that emphasized national, rather than ethnic, 
identity.
Namibian and Angolan San histories thus intersected in numerous ways through 
time and space. This suggests that at least to some extent there are comparisons 
and parallels to be drawn about their identity building processes in relation to the 
impact of  military intervention. The experience of  Namibian San since 
Independence may be salient for Angolan San in a context of  post confl ict nation-
building since 2002. The struggles that have taken place in Namibia’s West Caprivi 
over political legitimacy, authority and land among the state, NGOs and different 
ethnic groups serve as a useful illustration of  how San wartime identities informed, 
and presented challenges for nation-building. Tensions stemming from divisions 
between competing liberation groups suggest that historical narratives around San 
subversion and ethnicity could conceivably affect the degree to which San are 
included or excluded from reconciliation and nation-building efforts. A brief  dis-
cussion of  the current state of  affairs in Angola and recent elections highlights 
the specifi c issues that may arise as Angola embarks upon its own process of  
post-confl ict nation-building (McMillan 2005, UNSC 2003, Conteh-Morgan 2004). 
Its ruling party, the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA), will no doubt 
face similar decisions about how to deal with issues of  ethnicity and wartime 
allegiances (Corrigan 2008).
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San-Bantu Relations in the Pre-Colonial and Early Colonial Periods 
in Southeast Angola and West Caprivi, Namibia 
Although early travellers’ accounts are rich in detail, there is little thorough his-
torical analysis of  precolonial relations between San and Bantu groups in the area 
between the Kavango and Kwando rivers that now comprises southeast Angola 
and Namibia’s Caprivistrip. Regarding the relationship between Khwe and 
Mbukushu, Fisch (2005) suggests that the middle part of  the 19th century was a 
period of  close association and interdependence between the two groups, which 
was later adversely affected by broader political change. The late 19th century 
saw Lozi and Batawana chiefs view to bring Mbukushu under their control, as the 
Batawana polity strengthened (Tlou 1985, Taylor 2000). Khwe-Mbukushu relations 
appear to have subsequently become strained and more unequal. According to 
the missionary Wüst and linguist-ethnographer Köhler, by 1900 Khwe were report-
edly often treated violently or even put to death for minor crimes, and their 
settlements were sometimes raided for slaves (Boden 2005, M. Fisch, pers. comm.). 
Despite the inadequacy of  historical sources, in the context of  broader literature 
about the emergence of  inequality which marks San relationships with Bantu-
speaking groups (Wilmsen 1989, Gordon 1992, Suzman 2000, Widlok 2000), it is 
likely that Mbukushu attempts at domination of  Khwe in the early 20th century 
were successful. It is also likely, based on oral accounts collected in the last decade, 
that practices such as intermarriage and exchange were, and still are, integral to 
this domination and, accordingly, that identities were more fl uid than represented 
today (Rousset 2003, Boden 2003). Inge Brinkman’s analysis of  San-Bantu rela-
tions in southeast Angola converges with this interpretation: “trade and theft, 
intermarriage and serfdom all feature in this relationship” (2005: 120). Despite 
the variable, multi-faceted nature of  the relationship, San groups appear to have 
generally occupied a lower social status than Bantu, and were later placed at the 
bottom of  the social hierarchy devised by the Portuguese (Brinkman 2005, Sharp 
& Douglas 1996). 
With the onset of  colonialism, and later apartheid, West Caprivi was subject 
to flux and migration, to alliances and divisions, and to a limited number of  
government interventions. Archival evidence and oral histories suggest that the 
South West Africa administration contributed towards the shaping of  an ethnic 
identity and an ethnic ‘territory’ for the Khwe, firstly through veterinary policies 
in the early 1940s and later through the policies recommended by the 1950 
Commission for the Preservation of  Bushmen (Taylor 2007, Boden 2005). These 
policies fostered the differential treatment of  Khwe and Mbukushu, altered the 
balance of  socio-political power between them, and affected their respective access 
to land and natural resources, often in favour of  Khwe. 
Southeast Angola, however, appears to have remained relatively untouched by 
the colonial state. Chiefs were required to levy taxes and provide forced laborers, 
but rarely interacted with the administration; indeed, some villages would disap-
pear into the bush entirely when they received word that a colonial offi cer was 
on his way (Brinkman 1999, Barnett & Harvey 1972). The scarcity of  people and 
wide expanses of  vacant land discouraged the Portuguese from establishing a 
vigorous presence in the region, which they described as ‘the lands at the end of  
the earth’ or ‘hunger country’ (Brinkman 1999: 425, Brooke 1988). Southeast 
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Angola was extremely marginalized in the growing colonial infrastructure, and 
received little in the way of  the educational, economic, and medical benefi ts or 
services available in other regions of  the country. The region’s development was 
largely overlooked, leaving many inhabitants with little in the way of  material 
resources (Heywood 2005). As Brinkman describes, the decentralized nature of  
political power and limited colonial impact in the region contributed to a loose 
defi nition of  ethnicity. Ethnic identity was fl exible and people frequently altered 
their self-description based on where they were or to whom they were speaking 
(Brinkman 1999). A similarly loose distinction existed between people from the 
bush, vakamusenge; people from town, vakambongi; and vakamembo, people from the 
village. In the pre- and early colonial era, most people lived in villages and 
the bush was left to the San. When the Portuguese built towns, few Angolans 
chose to live in them. This changed, however, with the advent of  the independence 
struggle and the population shifts that accompanied it. 
San in the Angolan War for Independence 
In 1966, fi ve years after the beginning of  the war, MPLA guerillas opened an 
“Eastern front” in the remote southeast, forming camps and importing supplies 
from neighbouring Zambia (Sellstrom 1999, Marcum 1979). União Nacional para a 
Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) soon followed in establishing its own guerrilla 
presence in the southeast. There has been little research on the impact of  these 
events upon San groups, estimated to number around 11,000 in the 1960s 
(Brenzinger ND), or the ways in which San reacted to and interacted with the 
newly arrived forces. Brinkman’s oral history of  the political economy and iden-
tity-building processes is valuable here and is one of  the few analyses in English 
focused on the southeastern region during this period. Her fi ndings are based 
largely on her interviews with Angolan refugees living in Rundu, northern Namibia 
in the late 1990s. Brinkman acknowledges that “the experience of  the post-colonial 
war, of  fl ight and exile infl uenced the accounts as much as the experience of  the 
war between 1966 and 1975” (2005: 39). Her almost exclusive reliance on oral 
histories from one group of  refugees lacks certain details, such as the identifi cation 
of  specifi c San groups involved with the Portuguese army and the dates of  par-
ticular events. Brenzinger, for example, refers to four different Khoisan language 
groups, though the Khwe and !Xun speakers were certainly the vast majority 
(2001). Moreover, Brinkman’s account does not include San perspectives on the 
events in which they have been implicated. Whilst an imperfect resource for ana-
lyzing the role of  Angolan San in Angolan confl icts, the lack of  research in this 
area renders it one of  the more thorough accounts of  the colonial war in the 
southeastern region. 
With the arrival of  confl ict in the region, many villagers moved to town to 
escape the violence in rural areas. Brinkman argues that as populations shifted, 
the meanings of  the words vakamusenge, vakambongi, and vakamembo changed and 
hardened. Whilst these terms were originally used fl exibly without fi xed connota-
tions, the onset of  the war meant that town and bush became diametrically 
opposed identities. Villages were left vacant as their residents fl ed or were forcibly 
removed, and consequently the term vakamembo became “nearly obsolete” within 
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two years of  the outbreak of  fi ghting in the southeast (Brinkman 2005: 143). 
Whereas San had been the only people living in the bush prior to the war, life 
in the bush quickly became associated with the guerrilla forces, both MPLA and 
UNITA, their camps, and their village abductees. Whereas those living in the 
bush were viewed as ‘bandits’ by the Portuguese, those living in town were deemed 
colonial stooges and ‘traitors’ by the guerillas (Brinkman 2005). The division was 
more than a matter of  semantics: MPLA was known to kill those who ventured 
into town to visit relatives or secure food on the suspicion that they would reveal 
MPLA’s position, while the Portuguese were equally merciless towards towndwell-
ers who were found in the bush, wary of  civilians’ attempts to offer food or aid 
to the guerillas (Brinkman 2005, Breytenbach 1997).
In the bush, conditions were harsh and food was scarce. A small number of  
San had been abducted and taken to guerrilla camps, but for the most part were 
consigned to providing support to troops rather than bearing arms themselves or 
holding leadership positions. Portuguese forces sought recruits among the disaffected 
Angolans in the bush, offering food, clothing, and in some instances, pay. 
Knowledgeable of  their particularly marginalized status, and of  the inequalities 
between San and Bantu groups, the Portuguese recruited heavily among the San, 
and particularly among the Khwe in recognition of  the tension between the Khwe 
and their Bantu neighbors, who strongly supported UNITA (Brinkman 2005, Sharp 
& Douglas 1996). As was the case with the Khwe in Namibia, the Angolan San 
were appealing allies thanks to their excellent tracking skills and knowledge of  
the bush areas harbouring guerrillas (Gearon 2002, Hallett 1978). Distrustful of  
the guerrillas and eager to reap the benefi ts offered by the Portuguese, many San 
joined the Portuguese army. 
In doing so, they moved from the bush to the Portuguese barracks near town, 
often involuntarily, contributing to the redefi nition of  ‘town’ and ‘bush’. In the 
employ of  the Portuguese army, the San developed a reputation for exceptional 
brutality. Brinkman reports that in her interviews with Angolan refugees in Namibia, 
the theme of  ‘Bushmen betrayal’ came up repeatedly (2005: 121). Many of  the 
refugees who had lived in guerrilla camps during the independence war viewed 
the San as the most terrifying of  all those fi ghting, believing that San would not 
only kill any black person they came upon, but mutilate their victims horribly. 
Refugees told stories of  PIDE (International and State Defense Police), the 
Portuguese secret police force, that depicted scenes in which “prisoners were taken 
to the bush, where they were offered a delicious meal with lots of  alcoholic drinks 
and read to from the Bible before being killed by the Bushmen, who all received 
a bottle of  booze as compensation” (2005: 118). There is little evidence to support 
these claims, and the effect of  time and myth on people’s recollections should not 
be underestimated. Indeed, other reports of  wartime brutality attribute vicious 
attacks to the Portuguese, with no mention of  the Bushmen (Barnett & Harvey 
1972). Yet Brinkman emphasizes that stories of  San brutality were not intended 
symbolically, stating that “the informants wanted to preserve the horror of  PIDE, 
not symbolically allude to their fears” (2005: 119). Regardless of  its veracity, the 
prevailing belief  was that the San were out for revenge against the Bantus who 
had treated them poorly in the past. Even the Portuguese, who by many accounts 
acted brutally themselves, seemed to view the San as barbaric killers, a  characteristic 
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that fi t in neatly with stereotypes of  them as primitive people, similar to those 
later upheld by the SADF, with animal-like instincts.
Despite Portuguese and Bantu beliefs, a thirst for blood or revenge against the 
supposedly oppressive Bantu seems to have less to do with San collaboration than 
the desire to obtain the benefi ts offered by the Portuguese. Though not all soldiers 
received formal pay, they were fed, clothed, sheltered, and exempt from paying 
taxes. Additional rewards were given to those who informed the Portuguese about 
subversive activity and, according to Gordon (1992), to those who brought back 
physical evidence of  their success in killing guerilla fi ghters. For a people who 
had long been relegated to inferior status in an already-marginalized region, the 
chance for increased material well-being was likely diffi cult to pass up, while the 
political issues at stake had much less salience to people living so removed from 
the colonial centers. The social benefi ts of  increased status and authority deriving 
from San being designated as locally knowledgeable and valuable trackers were 
probably also compelling motives for joining the Portuguese army. The absence 
of  primary testimony from the Angolan San themselves, however, means it is 
diffi cult to assess how and why they made the choices they did.
In Brinkman’s oral histories, regardless of  their actual motivations, San were 
stigmatized as traitors and collaborators by Angola’s liberation movements, and 
were blamed for the repression suffered. After the war concluded in 1975, when 
UNITA surveyed the wishes of  the southeastern population in an attempt to curry 
favor, many called for banishing the remaining San and for killing Khwe specifi -
cally in retribution for their collaboration with the Portuguese (Brinkman 2003). 
This particular animus towards the Khwe may be because they, to a greater extent 
than other San groups, served in the Portuguese army in a fi ghting capacity and 
were thus visible symbols of  the Portuguese offensive (Sharp & Douglas 1996). 
The tensions that had existed between Khwe and Bantu were likely also exacer-
bated by the shift in town and bush identities and the subsequent violent estrange-
ment of  the two populations. In general, calls for revenge against the ‘traitors’ 
were reportedly frequent (Brinkman 2003, 2005). By that time, however, few San 
remained in Angola. Refugees report that as many as half  of  the some 11,000 
San living in southeast Angola in the early 1960s (Brenzinger n.d.) were killed in 
confl ict or were massacred, whilst others were displaced in waves over the years 
across four countries (Angola, Namibia, Botswana and Zambia). Most of  those 
who survived fl ed to the Caprivi in Namibia, hoping to escape the violence and 
the threat of  retribution from UNITA and MPLA guerrillas (Brenzinger 2001, 
Boden 2005). Others, mostly !Xun, joined the National Liberation Front of  Angola 
(FNLA) prior to its disintegration. At that point, some of  the !Xun who had 
fought with the FNLA used the movement’s ties with the South African military 
to join the SADF in Namibia (Sharp and Douglas 1996). Brenzinger (2001) reports 
that between 1974 and 1978, after the Portuguese withdrawal, approximately 6,000 
!Xun left Angola. Two thousand of  these, mostly Vasekele !Xun, ended up in 
Caprivi at the SADF’s Omega camp (Fisch 2005). The geographical shifts and 
displacements said to have taken place place during this time are spatially depicted 
in a series of  maps by Brenzinger (Brenzinger n.d.).
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San in the Namibian War for Independence 
Namibia’s independence struggle began not long after Angola’s, in 1964. From 
the late 1960s, a crucial factor in the ongoing formation of  contemporary identi-
ties, political authority and claims to resources in West Caprivi was this area’s 
20-year occupation by the SADF, when the area was used as a springboard for 
operations into Angola against SWAPO forces. The military occupation deeply 
infl uenced the Khwe relationship both with other ethnic groups and later with 
the post-apartheid state (Gordon 1995). Seegers (1996: 221) reports that the San 
were the fi rst and only group drawn on by the SADF for recruits prior to 1974. 
In that year, the SADF established both Alpha camp and Omega bases in the 
Caprivi and began recruiting Khwe men, and !Xun (also called Vasekele) from 
southern Angola (Gordon 1995, Boden 2005). According to an army account, 
Khwe who crossed into Angola on SADF tracking missions also sought to convince 
fl eeing Vasekele to join the SADF at Omega, a task that apparently took “little 
persuasion” (Gordon 1992: 185). 
As an elderly !Xun woman in Omega described, “In Angola we were suffering; 
there was [armed confl ict]. P.W. Botha brought us [here] from Angola . . . the Boers 
told us we’d die [there] if  we didn’t leave”.1 In the wake of  their recruitment, 
anthropologists, UN offi cials and SWAPO representatives alike represented !Xun 
as ill-equipped to make informed decisions (Kolata 1981: 563). As Wilmsen reported, 
however, !Xun were clearly aware of  not just the material benefi ts of  military con-
scription: “they get a steady diet, prestige, and are treated, in their view, more like 
other Africans and less like lower class citizens” (cited in Kolata 1981: 563). 
Within four years, the military base at Omega housed 3,000 people, or nearly 
half  the area’s population. Evidence suggests that the Khwe and !Xun quickly 
grew dependent on the SADF, and Omega functioned as what Rob Gordon calls 
a ‘total institution’ – while men trained for the army, children were taught the 
South African curriculum and women were provided with Christian-minded 
‘activities’ including sewing (Gordon 1992: 186, Boden 2005, Lee & Hurlich 1982). 
Some in the SADF sought to portray this as the fi rst step towards ‘modern’ 
society, claiming that by militarizing the San they were in fact civilizing them 
(Lee 1986, Lee & Hurlich 1982). 
Yet the SADF simultaneously promoted a romanticised and essentialist discourse 
about their ‘Bushmen soldiers’ (Lee 1986; Gordon 1988, 1992, 1995). SADF 
Colonel Breytenbach (1997: 83), for example, described Bushmen recruits as 
“Stone-Age hunter-gatherers” who lived an “innocent and idyllic life” and who 
“could have shown us the way back to living in harmony with nature. . . the secrets 
of  the bush [and] how to feel at one with the spirit of  ancient Africa”. These 
same qualities were claimed to enhance their capacity for tracking and soldiering 
(Lee & Hurlich 1982). Whilst some SADF representatives acknowledged that 
‘Bushman’ society was threatened by their military involvement, others denied this: 
as one lieutenant claimed, “Our aim is not to try and Westernize them [. . .] but 
to make them better Bushmen” (Thatcher 1983: 417). 
1 Discussion, !Xun group, Omega, 21 August 2006. PW Botha was Defence Minister from 
1966-1978.
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The identity politics catalysed by the SADF were more complex than 
Breytenbach’s excerpts suggest, and indeed the SADF’s view of  San much more 
ambiguous, contrary to Gordon’s argument (Sharp & Douglas 1996). The Khwe 
and !Xun, with their respective identities, relationships and allegiances, had already 
been infl uenced by their experiences of  the Angolan independence war and pro-
vided an additional pool of  veteran recruits for the SADF. In 1975, during the 
SADF’s Operation Savannah into Angola, the Angolan Khwe who had expert 
knowledge of  the area came to be seen as ‘crack soldiers’. These men were in 
particularly high demand given their experience under the Portuguese, and some 
Namibian Khwe felt slighted by the higher salaries and privileges that the ‘new-
comers’ were afforded, including permission to carry weapons (Boden 2005). It 
was after this, helped by the media and visiting politicians in the late 1970s, that 
the ‘Bushman soldier’ myth became fully-fl edged. Omega was used to show a 
strictly-regulated fl ow of  visitors how SADF was ‘winning the hearts and minds’ 
of  indigenous Namibians and working to ‘uplift’ them while preserving their cul-
ture (Boden 2005, Gordon 1992: 187). As Sharp and Douglas (1996) explain, the 
Bushman myth created a problem for the SADF, because it was the smaller, 
lighter-skinned !Xun who fi tted the public stereotype of  ‘Bushmen’(we need to 
decide whether to capitalise or not and keep it consistent), and not the taller, 
‘blacker’, Bantu-like Khwe. From the SADF’s perspective, however, the !Xun did 
not show the military prowess of  the Khwe. Hence, to maintain the image of  
the SADF’s ‘crack ethnic unit’, the !Xun and Khwe were kept together. 
In line with apartheid ideology, processes of  racial and ethnic ‘othering’ were 
central to the SADF’s strategy in West Caprivi (Grundy 1983, Gordon 1988, Lee 
1986). These reinforced Khwe fears of  and antagonism towards Bantu groups. 
The SADF demonised SWAPO’s liberation forces, and claimed that primordial 
hatred between San and other tribes underlay the San choice to join the army: 
“A Bushman’s hate for SWAPO will give you the shivers. . . they hate SWAPO 
because [SWAPO] enslaved them and took their daughters for prostitutes”2 (Gordon 
1992, Sharp & Douglas 1996). As Rousset (2003) and Taylor (2007) describe, 
Khwe were continually categorized by the SADF as ‘different’ from other Africans 
and encouraged to exercise this power (Lee 1986). Boden reports that 
“Mbukushu and other blacks daring to come into the military camps were declared 
fair game for the Bushmen soldiers, [who were] encouraged to do as they pleased 
with blacks. . . [P]eople who were children at the time remembered [being] encouraged 
to throw stones at black beggars in the camps.”3
Yet contrary to claims about primordial aggressions, accounts from SADF offi cers 
and observers suggest that Khwe, !Xun, and other San joined SADF battalions 
largely based on economic incentives, similar to those offered by the Portuguese in 
Angola. In the case of  the !Xun as well as the Khwe, fear of  retaliation from 
MPLA and UNITA guerrillas for having collaborated with the Portuguese was an 
additional incentive to join (Smith et al. 2000, Gordon 1992, Breytenbach 1997). 
2 SADF Commandant Botes, Sunday Tribute, 1st March 1980, cited in Gordon (1992: 186).
3 G. Boden, pers.comm., e-mail, 13 June 2006.
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In sum, whilst the contributions of  the colonial and apartheid administrations 
to the construction of  ethnicity in West Caprivi and southeast Angola should not 
be overstated, and whilst ethnic identities may have remained fl uid in a number 
of  manners, the SADF engagement in Caprivi undoubtedly contributed towards 
hardening these San identities. 
The Khwe since Namibia’s Independence
In 1989, with Namibia’s independence imminent, the SADF offered Khwe and 
!Xun employees the option to relocate to South Africa, allegedly to escape repri-
sals from the SWAPO-led government. Between 3000-4000 did so (Brenzinger 
2001; Gordon 1992, 1995, Sharp & Douglas 1996). For the Vasekele, it was the 
second time that they believed relocation was necessary to avoid retaliation from 
a victorious warring party, and only about three hundred chose to remain in 
Caprivi (Gordon 1992; Brenzinger 2001 n.d.). After arriving at the Schmidtsdrift 
military camp in South Africa, however, the ‘Bushmanness’ that had previously 
rendered them so valuable became a liability: they were now simply “former 
mercenaries who had outlived their usefulness” (Sharp & Douglas 1996: 326). 
Rather than rewarding their service to the SADF, the South African government 
appeared to view the Khwe and !Xun as a fi nancial burden. Faced with this 
reality, the !Xun sought to mobilize a Bushman identity that had sway among 
international donors and NGOs. They presented a different portrait of  
‘Bushmanness’ than that utilized by the SADF: instead of  depicting themselves as 
born soldiers, they emphasized the image, fuelled by earlier anthropological research, 
of  themselves as the ‘harmless people’ (Sharp & Douglas 1996: 327, Marshall 
Thomas 1959). !Xun have formed a coalition with other Northern Cape groups 
claiming an identity as ‘fi rst people’ in order to press the state to recognize their 
traditional leadership and languages. Additionally, !Xun leaders have tapped into 
the global discourse around indigenous and aboriginal rights and forged links to 
networks of  ‘fi rst people’ around the world (Sharp & Douglas 1996). 
In Namibia, meanwhile, President Nujoma criticized the SADF’s relocation of  
San, and his pre-occupation with colonial/apartheid ‘divide and rule’ tactics was 
notable in the media.4 His concerns were not unjustifi ed: the apartheid govern-
ment and the SADF strengthened a variety of  ethnic divisions, and stirred Khwe 
fears about political revenge that lasted well into the 1990s. The SADF’s with-
drawal from West Caprivi also signaled dramatic socio-economic change for the 
Khwe who constituted 80% of  its population: the end of  wage labour, new ambi-
guities over land tenure, extensive food aid, increased Khwe reliance on state 
welfare, and social tensions among different ethnic groups (Gordon 1995). The 
majority of  Khwe reverted to veldfood collection, cultivation and small-scale stock 
farming to survive during the 1990s (Rousset 2003) and employment opportunities 
were extremely scarce. Lastly, unlike many other ethnic groups in Namibia, the 
Khwe leadership is not recognized by the government, despite Khwe efforts to 
4 Windhoek Observer, ‘Bushman pull-out complete’, 24 March 1990; The Namibian, ‘SWATF 
Exodus to SA’, 23 February 1990; The Namibian, ‘Nujoma slams SA on Bushman move’, 
20 February 1990.
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secure such recognition. A chief  from the neighbouring Mbukushu group claimed 
from the mid-1990s that West Caprivi and all its residents fell under his jurisdic-
tion. Meanwhile, the !Xun population diminished even further, with some migrat-
ing to Bushmanland and Kavangoland, and by 2006 was a virtually invisible 
population in West Caprivi, with an estimated 65 self-identifying members (Taylor, 
pers. comm) who were particularly associated with foraging and ‘the bush’ by 
Mbukushu neighbours. 
Based in part on their multi-layered socio-economic exclusion (Suzman 2002), 
Khwe claimed in the 1990s to have been stigmatised as traitors for their histori-
cal involvement with the SADF. They also claimed to have been tarnished for 
their post-independence record of  supporting the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance 
(DTA) rather than the ruling SWAPO party. Lastly, they were accused of  col-
laborating with both UNITA rebels and Namibian secessionists. We deal with 
these in turn, but each was connected to contestations over legitimacy and author-
ity among different ethnic groups and government. Some non-Khwe and govern-
ment representatives cast Khwe as a politically ‘subversive’ threat to the 
post-apartheid nation state. 
Discourses about Khwe subversion can be contextualised within processes of  
post-Independence ‘nation-building’ which have aimed to tear down the racial and 
ethnic legacies of  apartheid (Forrest 1994, Fosse 1997, Kjaeret & Stokke 2003). 
Other signifi cant factors include the rise of  single party dominance in Namibia, 
the government’s increasing intolerance of  criticism and opposition, and its exclu-
sionist tendencies (Bauer 2001, Melber 2003). In this regard, Khwe were not alone 
in being framed as a threat to national ‘unity’ (eg. Kjaeret and Stokke 2003), but 
the political dynamics of  East Caprivi certainly provided rich material for this 
framing. Specifi cally, Khwe ‘subversion’ must be understood in the context of  the 
East Caprivian-led secession attempt in 1999, which clearly demonstrated the 
limitations, or even failure, of  Namibia’s nation-building, as well as being a corol-
lary of  the political and socio-economic marginalisation of  Caprivians. Caprivi as 
a whole became a highly politically sensitive area in the late 1990s, and this was 
exacerbated by the dyanamics of  Angola’s civil war on its borders. In turn, dis-
courses about Khwe subversion were nuanced and effective means of  political and 
socio-economic exclusion. 
Namibia’s Secessionist Movement and the Angolan Civil War 
The Caprivi Liberation Front’s secession attempt – southern Africa’s most recent 
instance of  rebel armed insurrection – has surprisingly received barely any thor-
ough analysis, the most comprehensive being Fisch (1999) and Forrest (2004) (cf. 
Zeller 2007). It is clear however that the secession attempt and its advocates were 
products of  long-standing ethnic and party politics in East Caprivi (Fosse 1997, 
Forrest 2004), in which the vast majority of  Khwe appear to have played no part 
(Suzman 2002). Nevertheless, this section provides a brief  account of  the reasons 
the Namibian government has for considering the Khwe subversive. It also shows 
how Namibian and Angolan political histories continued to intersect in ways that 
have affected San identities and socio-economic status in both countries. 
The secession movement was mainly supported by Lozi-speaking Mafwe people 
who historically had an antagonistic relationship with SWAPO. It was led by 
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Mishake Muyongo, a member of  the Mafwe royal family, and a politician with 
a noteworthy career since the early 1960s in the leading ranks of  both the Caprivi 
African National Union (CANU) and SWAPO. SWAPO party divisions, witch-
hunts and abuses of  power in exile (Lamb 2001; Saul & Leys 2003) saw Muyongo 
break away to form an opposition party by 1985. This party then merged with 
the DTA, South Africa’s ‘puppet government’ partner in Namibia and the leading 
opposition party. In both Caprivi’s pre- and post-independence elections, and in 
contrast to the majority of  other regions, DTA won signifi cantly more voter sup-
port than SWAPO, in accordance with the region’s history of  party allegiances 
which fell along ethnic lines (Fosse 1997). 
As DTA’s President, Muyongo was Nujoma’s only rival candidate in the 1994 
presidential elections. In 1998, Muyongo was banned from DTA after allegations 
of  negotiating Caprivi’s secession with South African agents. After several arrests, 
2000 secession activists and their followers, some of  whom allegedly received 
military training from UNITA, fl ed to Botswana in late 1998. Namibian Defence 
Force (NDF) searches and interrogations were extended to Khwe villages in West 
Caprivi in the search for secession sympathizers (Boden 2003). As a result of  
harassment and intimidation, hundreds of  Khwe refugees also fl ed to Botswana. 
In August 1999 an armed attack on strategic locations in Katima Mulilo was 
quashed by the Namibian military, leaving 13 people dead. The government 
declared its fi rst-ever State of  Emergency and detained hundreds of  suspected 
collaborators (Bauer 2001), resulting in high-level charges of  extensive human 
rights violations (Bauer 2001, NSHR 2001, Melber 2003). On the tail of  the 
secessionist attempt, Namibia permitted the Angolan military to use the Caprivi 
region to attack UNITA-controlled areas in southern Angola. West Caprivi became 
the site of  numerous violent incidents including death and injury from mine blasts 
(Boden 2003). 
Following UNITA attacks in January 2000, large numbers of  Khwe residents 
once again fl ed into Botswana after intimidation by the NDF. NGO support for 
Khwe in West Caprivi during this period meant that NGOs too became suspect, 
and most organizations put their activities on hold. In 2000, several Khwe NGO 
staff  were arrested and/or severely harassed, whilst other staff  were questioned at 
length by Police and intelligence offi cers (Taylor 2007). Justifi ably, Khwe became 
increasingly fearful and distrustful of  the post-apartheid state. Many Khwe pre-
sented themselves as ignorant victims of  wider politics and constructed their lives 
in ‘the bush’ similar to what Michael Taylor (2000: 49) writes for Khwe in 
Botswana, as a ‘domain of  ignorance and powerlessness’. Khwe understood accu-
sations of  political ‘subversiveness’ as a means of  excluding them from ‘the nation’ 
and from ‘development’. 
Despite repeatedly denying accusations of  collaborating with rebel forces, ‘the 
Khwe’ remained suspect in the eyes of  government. As Boden (2003: 194) reports, 
government offi cials arguments included “that the Khwe were clever and sneaky, 
and it could never really be known what they did out there in the ‘bush’ ”, a 
realm of  danger and obscurity. This suspicion extended to the !Xun in Angola, 
for whom the custom of  crossing freely between Namibia and Angola on hunting 
trips was severely curtailed (Brenzinger 2001). Simultaneously, government suspicion 
of  Khwe in some instances was not altogether unjustifi ed. In the 1990s the Khwe 
apparently had considerable economic, though not political, ties with UNITA in 
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an area which some Khwe still used for gathering and as a winter residence. 
Some reportedly exchanged food aid and other basic necessities for guns to be 
used for hunting5.
Another signifi cant government concern were certain Khwe individuals who 
fi gured in UNITA attacks on West Caprivi in 2000. The alleged involvement of  
some Khwe individuals with UNITA created, over time, additional means by which 
both certain government offi cials and Mbukushu leaders could delegitimise Khwe 
authority. Atypical individuals such as these have contributed to ongoing military 
surveillance and intervention in West Caprivi over several years.
In sum, discourses about Khwe subversion and suspicion drew on real and 
alleged Khwe relationships to the SADF, the secession movement, and UNITA. 
Through these discourses, the peripheral area of  West Caprivi and its ‘deviant’ 
Khwe inhabitants were constructed by government offi cials as in need of  surveil-
lance. In 2006, this took the form of  regular intelligence activities in the area 
and escalations in the military’s presence around liberation war commemoration 
days and visits by state dignitaries. These discourses thus contributed to the con-
tinued socio-political exclusion of  Khwe.
Conclusion: Refl ecting on the San Legacy of  Military Collaboration
Gordon writes that in the 1980s, the San were ‘perhaps the most militarized 
ethnic group in the world’ (1992: 2, 1995). Whether or not this is empirically 
true, between the 1970s and the 1990s, San in southeast Angola and northeast 
Namibia were heavily engaged in a series of  conflicts that took place in the region. 
Their status as soldiers both impacted and was impacted by their San identity. 
The Portuguese army and SADF utilized stereotypes of  the San as ‘two-legged 
bloodhound[s]’ with ‘unbelievable’ tracking abilities and a ‘primitive’ culture to 
distinguish them from other Africans and mobilize their support in wars against 
liberation movements (Gordon 1992: 2). Those liberation movements, in turn, 
utilized the image of  the San as ‘distinct’ and ‘other’ to create narratives in which 
San were stigmatized as ‘traitors’ who collaborated with enemies, and were per-
ceived to be especially brutal. In the case of  Namibia, evidence suggests that the 
legacy of  San military identities has contributed to their multifaceted social, 
political and economic marginalization since independence. 
San identity-building has proved to be multi-authored and dynamic. Some govern-
ment offi cials contributed towards the formation of  a ‘subversive’ Khwe identity 
through constructing Khwe people as a threat to the ‘unifi ed’ post-apartheid nation, 
and susceptible to the meddling of  whites. Such representations were fuelled by 
Caprivi’s secession movement which epitomized the failures of  nation-building and 
the persistence of  ethnic separatism in the margins of  the Independent state. The 
notion of  Khwe political subversion also became interconnected with local con-
testations over land, resources and authority, in which NGOs were often closely 
involved. This gave rise in public discourse and media coverage to the theme of  
Khwe alliances with whites, foreigners and NGOs, in which the latter three were 
5 Interview, Trust for Okavango Cultural and Development Initiatives representative, Shakawe, 
Botswana, 17 September 2006.
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often confl ated. NGO workers often attempted to prioritize Khwe voices in devel-
opment projects, based not only on their marginalized status but their identity as 
an ‘indigenous people’. Such efforts were often viewed as biased by government 
representatives and other ethnic groups, some of  whose members were equally 
poor. In sum, the legacy of  San military collaboration had implications for NGO 
‘development’ activities, even 15 years after the end of  the independence struggle. 
Although claims of  San subversion must be understood in the context of  Khwe 
historical alliances with the SADF, many Khwe were not simply bereft of  agency 
and prey to incitement. Nor did they see themselves as acting in ways anti-thetical 
to national unity and development. Their relationships with NGOs sometimes 
demonstrated how they were effectively tapping into global discourses on indigene-
ity and the environment, in order to bolster their authority and access to resources. 
From the mid-1990s, for example, a signifi cant number of  Khwe leaders and 
residents in West Caprivi embraced NGO-led projects and discourses concerning 
environmental management and community-based conservation. They quite often 
drew on such discourses to further their own interests. Consequently, some Khwe 
thus actively engaged in, and contributed to government suspicion about alliances 
with whites and outsiders. 
Our refl ections on Angola are preliminary and would benefi t from more thor-
ough investigation. Yet, as Angola begins its own process of  nation-building, its 
newly elected government, along with NGOs concerned with inclusive development 
and human rights, may fi nd useful lessons embedded in the experience of  the 
country’s southern neighbor. The challenges facing southeast Angola are signifi cant. 
The area continues to be marginalized; healthcare and education services in 
southeastern Angola are largely absent and of  generally poor quality where they 
do exist (Brenzinger 2001) (Hitchcock et al. 2003). Economic opportunities are 
likewise limited. Angolan San are still in the process of  returning home, many 
from refugee camps and adopted communities in Zambia, Botswana, and Namibia. 
Most of  those who have returned have abandoned the places they once lived for 
new regions, by and large shifting from rural areas to urban ones (Kaun 2008). 
Life in the bush remains diffi cult, as the prevalence of  land mines poses a sig-
nifi cant danger and food insecurity is an ongoing problem. The extent to which 
the place-based identities of  vakambongi, vakamusenge, and vakamembo still exists is 
uncertain, and the impact of  these identities on people who return to Angola is 
unclear. Brinkman’s research among Angolan refugees in Namibia during the late 
1990s indicates that the dichotomy between the categories of  ‘town’ and ‘bush’ 
remained highly salient even after people had left those places behind, to the 
extent that the war itself  “was framed as a confl ict between townspeople and 
bushdwellers” (1999: 429). 
Whilst a marginal and now tiny population, estimated by NGOs to be 3,400 
!Xun and 3,500-4,000 Khwe6 out of  3.4 million returned Angolans, the Angolan 
San history of  marginalization and alliance with both the colonial authorities 
and the SADF may have implications for how their welfare and development is 
dealt with by the state. The longstanding divisions between competing liberation 
6 Irin News, ‘Angola: San walk fine line between development and tradition’, 16 March 2006 
(<www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=58456>, accessed 29 January 2009).
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movements may further complicate the process of  unifi cation. UNITA supporters 
in particular may be stigmatized for collaboration with the SADF against the 
MPLA; UNITA has long been dismissed as a ‘puppet organization’ and viewed 
as a tool of  outsiders and whites (Heywood 1989). 
In September 2008, Angola held its fi rst parliamentary election in sixteen years. 
The previous election in 1992 plunged the country back into civil war when 
UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi refused to accept his second-place fi nish. Though 
UNITA fi nished a distant second, party leadership accepted the results of  the 
election without protest. Yet the landslide that made MPLA’s victory indisputable 
could also prove dangerous, as it demonstrated that Angola has little in the way 
of  an effective opposition party. Angola, like Namibia, is for all intents and pur-
poses a one-party state that has been under the control of  the same political party 
since independence. In Namibia, single-party dominance has led to increasing 
intolerance of  disparate views and suspicion of  opponents. If  the same is true in 
Angola, UNITA supporters, like the San, may be perceived with distrust on the 
basis of  their past ‘subversion’. As southeast Angola has long been both a UNITA 
stronghold and the home of  San groups that collaborated fi rst with the Portuguese 
and later SADF, its inhabitants may be impacted by the political, social, and 
economic consequences of  negative discourses around collaboration, should these 
be invoked. 
In sum, though the peacefulness of  Angola’s recent elections is a sign of  prog-
ress in the country’s recovery from civil war, an examination of  the underlying 
questions of  identity in a region long divided suggests that the country has yet 
to face many of  its unresolved issues regarding authority, legitimacy, and inclusion. 
The place of  Angolan San in this socio-political landscape remains unclear. The 
ways in which San identity is constructed by different parties, as repatriated 
Angolans begin to engage with the MPLA-led government and each other present a 
ripe opportunity for future study, particularly in the understudied southeast region. 
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